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INTRODUCTION
A great deal of enlightening work has been done since studies in
international political economy have become a recognised academic
discipline. This has changed our conception of the domain of
international politics and economics. Still, there are some scholars who
prefer to use old spectacles to view new problems. This review article
concentrates on two books, one from each of these camps. Stephen
Krasner's Structural Conflict - The World Against Global Liberalism,
belongs to the realist camp which still embraces state-power ideas about
international relations (IR), while Susan Strange's The Retreat of the
State - The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, belongs to the
international political economy (IPE) camp, where emphasis is placed on
multiple actors in the international arena. To determine the content of
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each book and to get clarity on the perceptions and approaches of each
author the two books are discussed separately starting, first, with Krasner.
This is followed by an examination of the central theme of each book -
the role and nature of authority in international/global politics/economics.
Here, some of the ideas of other scholars are highlighted, and certain
theoretical issues are addressed. The paper concludes with a few ideas
regarding change in the global environment in which we find ourselves,
and the manner in which these have been addressed by the authors under
review.
KRASNER'S STRUCTURAL CONFLICT
In chapter one, Krasner (1985: 3) introduces his argument stating
that most explanations of North-South relations focus on economics at the
expense of politics, "on material well-being as opposed to power and
control", Most Third World states are domestically and int,ernationally
weak and are concerned about their vulnerability. One of the strategies
that Third World states have used to gain power and control (political
objectives) is to change the rules of the game where they have had access
to key international agendas. This has brought them into conflict with
Northern interests, because "most Southern countries cannot hope to cope
with their international vulnerability except by challenging principles,
norms, and rules preferred by industrialized countries" (Krasner, 1985:
3).
Krasner (1985: 3) states that weakness and vulnerability are
fundamental sources of Third World behaviour. Externally, Third World
states lack national power because they are unable to utilise their
economic and military resources, and internally they have
underdeveloped political and social systems. One of the prime strategies
for coping with vulnerability is to establish and maintain international
regimes that will benefit the Third World by endorsing "principles and
norms that would legitimate more authoritative as opposed to more
market-oriented modes of allocation". Authoritative international
regimes are seen as beneficial to Third World states because they provide
more stable and predictable transaction flows. Krasner's (1985: 5)
argument is not that developing countries prefer control to wealth, but
rather that authoritative regimes can provide them with both, whereas
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market-oriented regimes cannot. In their quest for more authoritative
international regimes, Third World states have used two strategies
(Krasner, 1985: 6): the first is to alter existing international regimes or
create ones that would address its weak position, e.g. the creation of
UNCT AD (the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development);
the second is to ensure that international regimes recognise the sovereign
authority of individual nation-states, that is establishing national controls.
Krasner (I 985: 13) says that the behaviour of the North and South
will increasingly be motivated by short-term calculations of interest rather
than by long-term goals: "Self-reliance - rather than interdependence
may serve the interests of the North as well as those of the South". This
behaviour can already be seen in what Krasner (1985: 14), referring to
Baumgartner et aI, classifies as two categories of political behaviour,
relational power and meta-power. Relational power refers to efforts to
maximise the values within a given set of institutional structures to
change other players' behaviour. Meta-power refers to those efforts to
change the institutions themselves, i.e. to change the rules of the game.
The New International Economic Order (NIEO) of the developing world
is an example of meta-power, where attempts were made to change the
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures that condition
international transactions.
Believing that vulnerability rather than poverty is the Third World's
drive for transforming international regimes, Krasner (I985: 27-28)
confirms that his study is based on a realist/structural approach to
International Relations (lR). States are the basic actors in the
international system and they condition the behaviour of other actors (e.g.
Multi-National Corporations, Non-Government Organisations, and
International Organisations) in their quest for territorial and political
integrity. Olson (1979: 471, in Baldwin, 1996: 154), who states that the
principal actors in the world political economy are multinational
corporations, international financial institutions, and national
governments, reflects the same notions. Olson refers to Galtung's theory
of economic sanctions which has as point of departure vulnerability, the
understanding of which depends on concentration - where the more a
state's economy depends on one product or trade with one partner, the
more vulnerable it becomes. States are not always free to act as they
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please as a result of structural considerations such as the distribution of
power in the international system, the individual state's place in that
system, and certain domestic factors such as ideology, interest groups,
state-society relations, and resources. Third World states are very
vulnerable to changes in the international economic environment
precisely because of their position in the international system. For this
reason both international power and international regimes have become
very important to Third World regimes, as command of the first can lead
to access to the latter.
In chapter two, Krasner explains the structural causes of Third
World strategies. He states that "(I)nternational asymmetries of
aggregate and issue-specific power resources are very high" (Krasner,
1985: 32). Because developing countries have weak domestic structures
and are internationally vulnerable, they adjust with great difficulty to
externally generated disturbances and systemic shocks. Only a very small
number of the larger developing nations, such as India and China, have
had reasonable success in following isolationist type economic policies,
and even these states are attempting now to integrate their economies into
that of the international economic system. Other developing countries,
e.g. the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) of East Asia, have
developed "flexible and adaptive domestic and political structures" to
help them adjust to external pressures and to make maximum use of
different opportunities in world markets (Krasner, 1985: 58). Despite
these attempts, the majority of developing nations remains weak
internationally and domestically. Market-oriented regimes may provide
these states with economic benefits, but this is no guarantee of domestic
stability during periods of global economic upheaval.
Krasner focuses on Third World goals and the determinants of
success in chapter three, where he repeats that developing countries have
acted in favour of international regimes based on authoritative, rather than
market allocation. In doing so, they have attempted to use a coherent set
of programs to challenge the liberal rules of the game, which Krasner
(1985: 85) describes as a "self-reinforcing mechanism of exploitation".
The variables that Krasner (1985: 59) states have influenced the extent to
which the Third World has been able to influence regimes in its favour
are, firstly existing institutions. The most important general institutional
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structure for the Third World has been the acceptance of the principle that
sovereign states are equal. This principle combined with open
membership to organisations such as the United Nations, have made it
possible for developing countries acting in unison to greatly influence and
even determine certain international agendas. The second variable is the
relative power position of the United States that saw a decline, especially
since the 1960s. The United States continued to recognise universal
international organisations but was not in a position to completely control
its agendas anymore. The third variable is the degree of ideological
coherence, or movement of thought, that the Third World has managed to
establish (Krasner, 1985: 60). Since the late 1940s, the developing world
has developed a "cognitive alternative" to the predominating liberal set of
ideas, of which a subjective self-identity was one of the most important'.
The Third World succeeded in depicting the global economy as an
"engine of exploitation", and thus was able to justify a move from liberal
to authoritative norms and rules over a wide range of issues (Krasner,
1985: 94).
In chapter four, Krasner (1985) explains that the Third World's
behaviour is not simply a response to inadequate economic performance.
The South has shown remarkable improvements in infant survival,
longevity, and literacy and especially oil producing states and newly
industrialised countries (NICs) have done well. The meta-political
strategy followed by the South is not the result of any international
regime failing to ensure economic benefit, but rather the reaction to
insecurity and vulnerability experienced by the South while acting within
existing rules. Krasner (1985: 96) states that the response shown by the
Third World to the rise in oil prices as a result of OPEC actions, indicates
that economic factors were and are not the only driving force behind
Third World actions. Despite higher trade deficits for almost all LDCs,
they supported OPEC in keeping with their coherent cognitive frame of
mind that opposed the hegemony of the rich North. Thus, Krasner (1985:
110) believes. that "analysts who see material considerations as the
fundamental motivation of third World behavior do not have an adequate
argument". Krasner (1985: 123-124) believes that the developing world
has managed to influence or change all regimes to which they had access.
I Haas (1980, in Young, 1996) pronounces similar-ideas when reflecting on the intellectual coherence
in the demands of Third World countries.
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At the least, they succeeded in undermining the liberal norms and
principles that were established directly after World War II.
In Part Two (Chapter VI-IX), Krasner uses a case study of the most
important issue areas in the North-South debate. It appears that Third
World states have used a "meta-political strategy designed to alter
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures, as well as
relational power strategy" with reasonable success (Krasner, 1985: 175).
This success can be related to the utilisation of existing institutional
structures, declining American power, and the presentation of a coherent
intellectual alternative to liberal capitalism. By using the "constitutive
principle" of the international system, developing countries have changed
the rules of the game in their favour with regards to direct foreign
investment (Krasner, 1985: 195). In the area of transportation,
developing countries were satisfied with the status quo in civil aviation
because the existing regime encouraged the development of national
carriers. In the area of shipping, changes were sought because most of
the world's fleet is owned and run by industrialised states, and here the
regime discouraged the development of national carriers (Krasner, 1985:
226). The regimes governing the global commons2 also warrant a brief
mention. Krasner (1985: 228) states unambiguously that in all global
commons issue areas, the developing world has supported regimes based
on direct or indirect authoritative allocation rather than the endowment of
individual public or private actors. In the area of global commons,
disagreements about general principles and norms between the
industrialised and developing world exist that reflect international power
disparities which cannot be overcome. Krasner (1985: 264) states that
mutually desired patterns of behaviour are therefore more likely to
emerge from arrangements focused on specific problems and rules rather
than on general principles.
In chapter ten, Krasner gives an indication of what his analysis
accepts and rejects. He makes certain predictions, and reaches certain
analytical conclusions. Firstly, Krasner's (1985: 267-8) realist-structural
approach rejects conference diplomacy (because it will end in frustration)
and attempts to change sovereign-subject relations (as it infringes upon
2 The global commons refers to areas that are difficult to enclose or privatise, such as the oceans,
Antarctica, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum (Krasner, 1985: 227)
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states' rights of sovereignty). Prescriptions on policies for the North
include the following: specific bilateral and multilateral transactions can
be entered into under the existing rules of the game; certain existing
international regimes operating on the principle of authoritative allocation
can be supported; and the North should consider the establishment of new
international regimes based on authoritative allocation and thus move
away from those governed only by principles of market allocation. What
Krasner does not admit (or recognise), is that it is not always up to states
to make these decisions. The markets and economic relationships are the
sources of these decisions.
Krasner (1985: 269, 294) makes the pessimistic prediction that the
skewed distribution of power in the international system will result in
continued tension and conflict in North-South relations. This conflict is a
result of "deep asymmetries of power" that leave almost all developing
countries exposed to changes in the international environment. There are
three possible developments that could lessen the intensity of North-
South conflict: improved capacities for some developing countries, less
Northern concern with existing international organisations, and more
collective self-reliance for the South and consequent del inking from the
North (Krasner, 1985: 269-270). According to Krasner (1985: 301-2)
both dependency theorists as well as realist thinkers favour a del inking
strategy over the long term. This brings Krasner (1985: 270) to the
conclusion that a realist or structural interpretation, as opposed to an
economist-Marxist one, is to be preferred. The irony in this argument,
from a structuralist point of view, is that it is precisely the use of a realist
approach by the rich industrialised countries that has led to the exclusion
of developing countries in the construction and direction of global
economic structures.
Krasner (1985: 306) makes an important distinction between
"economistic perspectives" and "realist approaches". The first is
concerned with "utility-maximising individuals", people seeking to
improve their wealth; the second is concerned with the behaviour of the
state. For Krasner (1985: 306) the state is a meaningful concept because
"the foreign policy behaviour manifested by these institutions is primarily
influenced by the distribution of power in the global system and the place
of the particular state in that system". Individuals, on the other hand, are
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restricted by the "structural constraints imposed by the balance of
power,,3.
Krasner (1985: 307) maintains that the Third World has
consistently attempted to move regimes from market-oriented toward
authoritative modes of allocation to improve both their power and wealth
situation; and thus address their situation of vulnerability in a world
dominated by the industrialised North. The national power disparities
between the North and South can however not be removed in a short
space of time and it is to be expected that this will remain a cause of
conflict - a problem which, according to Krasner, cannot be solved. A
problem with this view of Krasner is that it is not states, but rather
markets that create wealth. Another factor, which conflicts with
Krasner's notion of political power, is that most states do not seek
territorial expansion as a reflection of their power. Rather, states seek a
proportion of the market share for their national economies as a reflection
of their desire to be a player in the world economy. This is the thinking
that inspired Susan Strange to write a book that explains the gradual
demise of nation-state authority in the international system.
STRANGE'S THE RETREAT OF THE STATE
Susan Strange's The retreat of the state (1996) has as main theme
the decline of state authority in domestic and international affairs. She
states that most governments fail to render services traditionally ascribed
to states - "the maintenance of civil law and order, the defense of the
territory from foreign invaders, the guarantee of sound money to the
economy, and the assurance of clear, judicially interpreted rules regarding
the basic exchanges of property" (Strange, 1996: xii).
Strange (1996: xiv) reminds us that "politics is larger than what
politicians do", and that it would be prudent to look at the power
exercised by authorities other than the state. In Part I, she lays the
theoretical foundation for her argument that "the impersonal forces of
world markets are now more powerful than the states to whom ultimate
political authority over society and economy is supposed to belong". If
J Strange (1996) prefers not to maintain this distinction between state and economy, because authority
and the market cannot be separated in the integrated world that we find 9urselves in after the Cold War
en the development of communication technology.
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Strange is to be believed, the once more-powerful states have had to make
room for more-powerful markets. This leads her to mentioning some
paradoxes that immediately springs to mind, firstly, that state intervention
in the lives of individuals seems to be increasing; second, while some
states (in Europe and America) seem to be losing state authority, various
communities and aggregates of people around the globe are striving to
have their own states; and third, the decrease in state authority seems to
be an Anglo-Saxon phenomenon and is not felt by the Asian nations.
These paradoxes are real, but time should indicate that both the unity and
authority of these governments will decline (Strange, 1996: 7). An
example to support Strange's statement is the recent move by diamond
giant, De Beers, to try and salvage the sinking currency ship of Russia -
an example of a private company coming to the economic aid of a nation-
state.
One of the primary causes of the shift in state-market power is
technology (Strange, 1996: 7). Technological developments since 1945
has meant that states are no longer able to defend themselves against the
worst that military technology has to offer (mutually assured destruction).
Competition is also not so much about territory today, as it is about
getting access to and control over certain markets. Finance, says Strange
(1996: 9), is the second factor that is often neglected when a too narrow
state-state focus predominates. Against this background, Strange (1996:
12-13) explains the three premises that guide her argument: that politics is
a common activity not confined only to politicians; that power over
outcomes is exercised impersonally by markets; and that authority in
society and over economic transactions is legitimately exercised by
agents other than states, and are broadly accepted by those subject to it.
In chapter 2, Strange examines power and how it should be treated
in international political economy. She defines power as " ... simply the
ability of a person or group of persons so to affect outcomes that their
preferences take precedence over the preferences of others" (Strange,
1996: 17). She also criticises other scholars in IPE for not maintaining
adequate focus when power is a concern (Strange, 1996: 23). Power is
still primarily seen as capabilities, as "a property of persons, or of nation-
states as organised societies". This focus excludes looking at power as a
feature of relationships or as social processes that affect outcomes. Here,
Strange introduces the Gramscian perspective as set out by Robert Cox
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(1987) in Production, Power and World Order, where the focus is on the
production structure. Production makes it possible to transform resources
into instruments of power that shape the relationships between
international actors - relationships that were shaped by political actors
(states). This brings Strange (1996: 24) to the conclusion that
understanding of the international system, or "world order", requires that
the international political system of states and the global production
structure receives equal attention.
Cox (1987: 109) has indicated even before the end of the Cold
War, that the world order has undergone certain structural changes, the
first of that was the formation of a liberal international economy,
followed by an era of "rival imperialisms". The era after World War II he
calls the "neoliberal world order". This last structural change is
characterised by the internationalisation of production and the
internationalisation of the state. In the internationalisation of production,
knowledge in the form of technology is the principal resource in the
world economy. Cox (1987: 244) says that money can be made by those
with knowledge assets, e.g. in international credit. The
internationalisation of the state means three things to Cox (1987:254):
first, there is a process of interstate consensus formation that takes place
within a common ideological framework (liberalism); second,
participation in this consensus formation is hierarchically structured; and
third, the internal structures of states are adjusted to bring national
policies in line with the global consensus. This has led to a formation of
global societal forces which Cox (1987: 263) calls "internationalizing
corporatism". Cox's ideas are reflected more in the work of Strange than
in that of Krasner.
In chapter 3, Strange talks about "the limits of politics", and states
that political science students have defined their subject too narrowly,
concentrating too much on the state. Where economics comes into the
picture, it is necessary to adopt a broader definition that will include non-
state players who are able to exercise power over others. Elsewhere,
Strange (1995: 161) indicates that the state is no longer able to exercise
control over the domestic economy and can therefore not be regarded as
the primary unit of analysis in international politics. The "invasion by
transnational structures of the prerogatives formerly associated with the
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state means that the state shares its role as a unit of analysis" with other
states and non-state authorities. A definition proposed by Strange (1996:
34) for politics is "those processes and structures through which the mix
of values in the system as a whole, and their distribution among social
groups and individuals was determined". Strange (1996: 36-37) identifies
some conceptual problems that could be resolved by such a broader
definition of politics. The first is the separation of domestic politics from
international politics in literature and teaching. By extending the focus
from states to all players with authority, it is possible to ask how and by
whom values are allocated and political decisions taken to affect
outcomes. The second conceptual problem is the synthesis of the
political system of states and the economic system of markets. Again,
Strange (1996: 38) indicates that by extending the definition of politics
beyond states "to all sources of authority, to all with power to allocate
values", it is possible to treat the different worlds of government and
business as one.
In chapter 4, Strange explores how far and in what ways
transnational corporations (TNCs) have "encroached" on the authority of
the state, why this happened, and what the consequences are4. Strange
(1996: 48-51) focuses attention on three changes in international
production that have had political significance. The first is the
diversification from minerals, agriculture and primary production to
processing, manufacturing and services that the majority of TNCs have
undergone. Second, international production has become truly
multinational where firms that produce goods and services internationally
originate from many countries. Third, is the switch in employment and in
trade from manufacturing to services.s Strange (1996: 52) points out that
the old North-South asymmetry between manufacturing production
(North) and primary production (South) is repeated between sellers and
buyers in the changed production system of the 1990s. Together, these
three trends indicate a substantial shift of power "from territorial states to
world markets, and inclirectly to the major players in those markets, the
transnational corporations" (Strange, 1996: 53).
4 Hurrell (1995: 138) states that the proliferation of environmental regimes is evidence of the way in
which state authority is being extended and reasserted.
5 Strange (1996:51) mentions transport, communications, data base information finance, asset
management, advertising, public relations, auctioning, publishing and marketing, international legal
services, accountancy, management consulting, medical, education, architecture, construction, hotel
and tourism as some of these services.
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This brings Strange (1996: 54) to four hypotheses that support her
argument that TNCs have encroached on the power of states in
determining the allocation of values: (1) States have retreated from their
ownership and control over industry, services and trade, and from
directing research and development of technology (privatisation); (2)
TNCs have done more than states in relocating wealth to the developing
world (relocating manufacturing industry); (3) in labour relations, TNCs
have taken over from governments the role of managing and resolving
conflicts of interest (labour management); and (4) TNCs have
increasingly managed to escape taxation of corporate profits and have
themselves become collectors of certain revenues (taxation). Strange
(1996: 65) reiterates that TNCs have not taken over from states where
these matters are concerned, but they have managed to make significant
inroads into certain areas that have in the past been the exclusive domain
of national governments.
In chapter 5, Strange explores the argument between IPE scholars
that think nothing has changed, and those that think that considerable
changes have already taken place. She favours the latter. The main
points of difference between the international relations and international
political economy writers include, first, that states are regarded by IR
writers as the primary actors, while IPE writers focus not only on states
but also on non-state actors such as MNCs, NGOs, and individuals;
second, IR writers regard states as unitary actors, while IPE writers
contend that this is a gross oversimplification; third, IR theorists accept
that war and peace (and the resolution of conflict between states) is the
primary issue in world politics, while IPE theorists want us to extend the
scope of investigation to include any factor that influences security, such
as food shortage, disease, pollution, refugees, drug-trafficking, etc; and
fourth, IR thinkers maintain that individuals still maintain a strong
identity with the state that they regard as theirs, while IPE theorists argue
that perceptions of individual identity are much more complex than such
a simplistic explanation. Identity is cultural and geographical as much as
it is political, and very few states have entirely natural and organic
national identities (Strange, 1996: 68-70). The majority of states, says
Strange (1996: 72) cannot claim a degree of loyalty from the citizen
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"substantially greater than the loyalty given to family, to the firm, to the
political party or even in some cases to the local football team".
Strange is certainly not alone in her ideas on the changing role of
security. Tickner (1995: 181) indicates that some Northern perspectives
of security are moving away from "military-centered notions of national
security", and others are reviving traditional ideas of national security
along the lines of a Pax Americana (hegemonic stability theory), while
Southern perspectives are shifting to a multidimensional definition of
security which emphasises security interdependence. In similar fashion
Groom and Powell (1994: 84) indicate that the world is state-centric no
more, and that governments now find it difficult to provide the twin
elements of legitimacy - security for its citizens and a secure economy.
Thus, security is not just about the causes of war and conditions for peace
anymore, it is a much broader concept. Security is best conceptualised in
a context of world order and global governance (Groom and Powell,
1994: 85).
Strange (1996: 72) emphasises that she is not attempting to say that
the state is disappearing or in its final days, merely that it is in a process
of change brought on by structural developments in the world society and
economy. Strange (1996: 73-82) tests this assertion by considering ten of
the important power responsibilities traditionally attributed to states and
claimed for it by many political leaders. For the sake of brevity, these ten
responsibilities are listed in table format (see Table I).
The examination of these ten responsibilities brings Strange (1996:
82) to the conclusion that "the domain of state authority in society and
economy is shrinking". What used to be the exclusive domain of state
authority, now has to be shared with other sources of authority. This is
also evident when extending the examination from the territorial character
of the state to the purpose of the state, a concept Strange (1996: 84)
borrows from Schmitt. The financial difficulties of maintaining a welfare
state character is being supplanted by a "competition state", which means
that states have to give up certain monopolies in order to remain
competitive in the liberal world economy which does not tolerate barriers.
Other authors express similar ideas. Calhoun (1995: 111) makes it clear
that states are still powerful arenas for social movements to pursue their
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goals, but that the internationalisation of capital and new political forms
like the European Community are removing a great deal of power from
the grasp of "popular agency mediated through social movements". Gill
(1997: 13) indicates that the restructuring of global production and power
are transforming the basis of political authority, legitimacy and
accountability away from national governments towards global markets.
No STATE RESPONSIBILITY IPE/STRANGE view
I Defending national territory. Perceived need exists, but in many
states at a lower level.
2 Maintain value of currency. Now a national and collective
responsibility.
3 Choose the appropriate form of States have no choice but to liberalise
capitalist development. their economies.
4 Correcting market booms and States can do very little on their own
slumps. against market fluctuations.
5 The welfare function. State budgets are stretched to the limit,
and only new standards of welfare
spending will ensure the survival of
welfarism.
6 Raising revenue through taxation. No longer an exclusive monopoly of
state power, e.g. criminal associations.
7 Control over foreign trade, Firms and their responses to the
especially imports. markets determine the content of trade.
8 Building of economic In the developed world this function is
infrastructure. largely privatised.
9 Ensuring competitiveness by Structural change has made the
provision of monopolies. protection of monopolies too costly for
states.
10 Monopoly over the use of violence Mafias and terrorist groups in all areas
and force. of the world are the instrumental
symptoms of structural change.
Table I (Adapted from Strange, 1996: 73-82)
An increase in cross-border economic integration is making it
difficult for governments to control events within their borders. These
difficulties, which Lawrence (1996: xx) summarises as "diminished
autonomy", helps explain the rise in tensions from the competition
between political sovereignty and economic integration. Economic
integration is causing certain individuals and groups to ascribe to sets of
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global values different to that of the nations to which they "belong"
(Lawrence, 1996: xxii). Lawrence, Bressand, and Ito (1996: 22) state that
"pressures from divergent national practices, international spillovers, and
the erosion of the global commons are leading to direct challenges to
national sovereignty". Ohmae (1995:129) is adamant that the nation-state
as we know it is in decline when he says it "has begun to crumble,
battered by a pent-up storm of political resentment, ethnic prejudice,
tribal hatred, and religious animosity". Ohmae (1995: 130) gives three
reasons for the demise of state authority: the first relating to the
movement of people, ideas information and capital across borders which
guides state decisions towards attempt to keep resources; second, flow of
information is causing a convergence of tastes and interests; and third, the
nation-state, which was an engine of wealth creation in its mercantilist
phase, has become a vehicle for wealth destruction. Ohmae (1995: 131)
eloquently states that since "nation-states were created to meet the needs
of a much earlier period, they do not have the will, the incentive, the
credibility, the tools, or the political base to play an effective role in the
borderless economy of today". Here, Ohmae indicates that states are
incapable of putting global logic first in their decisions, and are no longer
meaningful units in which to think about economic activity. There are
thus various authors supporting Strange's thesis on the retreat of the state.
Part, II (chapters 6-12) of The retreat of the state contains the
empirical evidence for the hypotheses set out in Part 1. By first looking at
authority beyond the state (Chapter 6), Strange sketches the background
to the discussion of six non-state "actors"/institutions which are claiming
authority and power on various levels and of various intensities. It is
sufficient to only name these: telecommunications, organised crime,
insurance businesses, the "Big Six" accountants, cartels, and the
econocrats or international organisations.
Chapter 13 contains the conclusions she arrives at after the
empirical evidence is presented. In finding an answer to the question,
"Who, or what is responsible for change?", which was asked in the
beginning of the book to avoid state-centrism, Strange (1996: 185)
proposes technology, markets and politics, where politics means more
than the actions of governments and politicians. Only such a triangular
model can explain changes in international organisation, domestic
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policies for national economies, and the competition between firms in the
market (Strange, 1996: 187). Another aspect about change is the apparent
loss of security in certain areas as a result of power shifting upward from
weak states to stronger states, power shifting sideways from states to
markets, and in certain areas, the evaporation of power where it is no
longer exercised by anyone (Strange, 1996:189). Thus, the retreat of the
state will be accompanied by a decline in the rule of law and an increase
in violent conflict within state borders rather than across them. As
Strange (1996: 190) notes, "(n)ow that the world market economy has
outgrown the authority of the state, national governments evidently lack
both the power and the will to make good the deficiencies of inequality
and instability that have always gone with growth and change in market
economies".
Another consequence of the retreat of the state relates to the
diffusion of legitimacy and democracy. If the "asymmetry of state
authority" means that voter-choice will not have meaningful outcomes,
the worth of elections will only be symbolic (Strange, 1996: 197).
Strengthening, and for some, exacerbating this point, is the fact that none
of the non-state authorities to whom authority has shifted was
democratically elected. This also has consequences for accountability,
which Strange (1996: 198) says is already lacking in the system of global
governance which has no form of opposition.
Having examined the content of the two books under review
separately, it would be useful to compare them to see what they have in
common, and where they diverge on specific issues.
IR VERSUS IPE
Susan Strange (1994) makes it clear that she regards Stephen
Krasner as an IR scholar, and that she sees herself as an IPE specialist.
Krasner regards the changes that have taken place since the demise of the
Cold War and the Soviet Union and the globalisation of the world
economy, as having little effect on the position of states as primary role
players in world affairs. Strange is adamant that this view disregards the
changes that are causing states, and specifically their authority, to become
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secondary role-players (in some cases, non-players) in the globalised
world.
It is also clear that the books of Krasner and Strange have different
theoretical and different unit of analysis approaches. Krasner claims to
be a realist, and his insistence on putting the state and power at the centre
of his study confirms this. His explanation of the behaviour of Third
World states as being an attempt to address their position of vulnerability
when seeking authoritative allocation of resources rather than market
forces of allocation does at first seem to place him among the ranks of
structuralist thinkers or even dependencia theorists. I think that this could
be a premature conclusion, because Krasner's suggestion for improving
the position of the South is cloaked in realist jargon. His acceptance of
the continued conflict on a national level between sates in the North and
South as unsolvable, which is caused by wealth inequalities, also
disregards the dramatic advances made by newly industrialised countries
and other poor countries in recent decades. It further gives no recognition
to the fact that interaction between states, or any aggregate of people, no
longer have to be determined by ideological or security concerns as they
used to do during the Cold War. A city like Cape Town can have cultural
and economic links with cultural groups in Europe; and individuals can
move sums of money on a daily base that are larger than the gross
domestic product of many recognised sovereign states. This latter
approach is closer to that used by Strange, who regards herself as
belonging to the international political economy camp where the
emphasis is on the interaction between markets and states, or wealth and
authority.
From the discussion above it is clear that Krasner uses states'
authority as his unit of analysis in explaining why governments of the
South prefer authoritative allocation when attempting to address their
position of vulnerability. Strange, on the other hand, talks of the demise
of state authority in certain areas in favour of non-state sources.
Although both units of analysis focus on authority, Krasner focuses more
on politics (the state - an IR focus), while Strange focuses more on
economics (the market - an IPE focus).
162 Scientia Militaria - 28( 1) 1998
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 28, Nr 1, 1998. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za
From the books of Krasner and Strange it is evident that the study
of power and authority and the position of the state are still important and
deserve our attention, whether we prefer a more state centered approach
(IR), or one where multiple actors and markets are included (IPE). But
how should we think about power and authority and the role of states?
Are the old ideas about state-centrism still relevant, or should we revise
the way we think of authority, regardless of our theoretical preferences?
In answering these questions it is useful to remind us of the ways that
power and authority were viewed in the past, especially before the end of
the Cold War. The respected IR scholar, Keohane (1983, in Young,
1996), saw the actors in international politics as states and governments.
Haas (1980, in Young, 1996) points to the importance of state power (and
government), and talks of interdependence and knowledge. Jervis (1988,
in Young, 1996) also speaks from realist point of view and regards states
as the main (only) actors. He does admit that the focus on individual
actors has a blinding effect as to the broader setting/context.
Keohane (1988: 379, in Young, 1996: 289) states that
"(c)ontemporary world politics is a matter of wealth and poverty, life and
death", but indicates that the focus of analysis is state sovereignty and
autonomy and there is a clear distinction between politics and economics.
Keohane's (1988: 383, in Young, 1996: 293) definition of institution
refers to "a general pattern or categorisation of activity or to a particular
human-constructed arrangement, formally or informally organised". The
realist approach in the article by Axelrod and Keohane (1986, in Young,
1996) is evident with their focus on military-security issues, game theory
and security in terms of the roles of the state and the military. When they
refer to political-economic issues, it is only with regards to trade wars.
Krasner (1991: 366, in Young, 1996: 454) indicates that for a large class
of global issues, the "classic agenda of the study of international politics -
security, autonomy, and the distribution of valued resources - power
needs to be given pride of place". In a later article, Krasner (1994)
maintains his realist stance where state control is seen as central to the
explanation of international political economy. He says that states are the
"ontological givens in the system, other actors are constituted by the
state". Realism is able to account for international political economy and
international security, even though it lacks empirical explanation of the
absence of war among democratic states (Krasner, 1994: 18).
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Susan Strange (1994) differs with these notions of Krasner and
other realist scholars when she explains that certain things have changed
since the end of the Cold War. She states that technology is the major
factor in the internationalisation of production that is changing the extent
of international business (Strange, 1994: 210). She believes that
structural change is transforming the role of the state on a national and
global level (Strange, 1994: 213). Change in the four primary structures
of finance, production, security and knowledge are eroding state power
while creating their own mechanisms for the provision of security,
revenue and services previously provided by states. Strange (1995: 172)
begs a shift in focus from a state-centred one to one focusing on the
system and the mix of values in it. With this is needed a broadening of
the concept of power to include structural and relational power, the power
to influence the ideas and actions of others (Krasner does talk of
relational and meta-power, but only in reference to international
structures and state interaction).
Strange (1994: 218) sends a clear message to Krasner and all
realists that studying international political economy rather than
international relations makes more sense because it extends more widely
the "conventional limits of the study of politics, and the conventional
concepts of who engages in politics, and of how and by whom power is
exercised to influence outcomes".
CONCLUSION
Krasner's Structural Conflict makes a compelling argument for the
reasons behind the actions of the states in the South, but his consistent
realist notions (even after 1990) of the nature of the international system
do not account for real changes that have taken place which affect the role
and position of states. This is where 1 tend to agree with Strange's The
Retreat of the State argument, that a changing global order is making
inroads into the domain of state authority. This means that a realistic
explanation of the dynamics in the international system, whether taken
from an lR or an IPE perspective, needs to include all role players that
execute authority, especially those involved in production and the,
exchange of capital. This requires a wary eye from all scholars of IR and
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IPE on the dynamic changes still in progress, whether they prefer the
political, the economic or the eclectic-mix approach. Change is not
embraced by all, less even accepted by some. But change cannot be
stopped and should not be ignored. It has become part of daily life at the
dawn of the twenty first century. We need to shape our thoughts and
lives to accommodate change, or be swamped by it. In today's world
where authority and power interact with wealth and capital, some scholars
seem better able than others to deconstruct these dynamics of change.
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